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protective role and to weigh Pillsbury's right to fair play against the
possible benefits to be derived by sanctioning a liberal interpretation of
what constitutes a legitimate exercise of the investigative powers of Congress. Electing to maintain an appearance of impartiality," the balance was
found in favor of the litigant.
Also exhibiting a protective attitude toward the agency, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that those exercising the judicial function must be free
from powerful external influence. Unfettered responsibility for administration of the Clayton Act within the policy standards set forth by the
legislature has been delegated to the FTC by Congress." It is important
to avoid the appearance that a change desired by Congress in agency treatment of particular issues may relate to a pending case rather than to a
rule used in applying statutory language. Pillsbury sets a standard to be
followed in this regard and tends to produce a behavior relative to administrative agencies which will instill public confidence in the administration
of the law and will thereby strengthen the administrative process."

Charles D. Tuttle

Denial of Priority and Pro Rata Sharing to Tax Claims
Under Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act
An individual sold all assets of a personally owned California business
and terminated the venture, leaving outstanding a county ad valorem tax
assessment on his personal property. He set up an unrelated business in
Houston, Texas, which did not prosper. More than six months after moving from California, he was adjudged bankrupt. The state of California
asserted a timely claim for priority on the tax debt under section 64 (a) (4)
of the Bankruptcy Act,1 and in the alternative sought to enter the bankruptcy proceedings as a general creditor. The referee found that none of
the assets upon which the tax was levied had entered the estate of the bankrupt, nor were any of the funds from the sale thereof directly traceable to
this estate; therefore he disallowed the entire claim. Held, affirmed: Under
the proviso to section 64(a) (4) of the act a state is not entitled to a pri" It is most important that the law appear to be justly administered in order to inspire public
confidence and strengthen the administrative process. See Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte
Communications With Administrative Agencies, 76 HARV. L. REV. 233, 273-74 (1962).
42 See note 36 supra.
4 See Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications With Administrative Agencies,
76 HAPv. L. REV. 233, 274 (1962).
1I1 U.S.C.A. S 104 (1966).
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ority for personal property tax claims when the bankrupt estate has no
interest in the property on which the tax was levied; further, a state is not
entitled to a pro rata share of the general hotchpot where the claim is covered by the proviso. In re Nussbaum, 257 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.'Tex. 1966).
I.

TREATMENT OF TAX CLAIMS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT

The Bankruptcy Act declares that certain unsecured claims are entitled
to full payment prior to distribution of the estate among the general creditors, even to the exclusion of the latter. Expenses of administration, wage
claims, expenses of creditors in certain instances, and taxes of both the
United States, the states, and their subdivisions are entitled to priority
under section 64(a) of the act.' Claimants for such priorities must meet
all requirements of the act.' Priority claims are subordinate to the claims
of secured creditors."
The statutory requirements for the establishment of a priority claim
under section 64(a) (4) of the act are (1) that the claim must represent a
tax" (2) legally due and owing by the bankrupt at the time the petition is
filed.! In addition, (3) the claim must not have been released by a discharge in bankruptcy.' Finally, (4) it must accord with the standards established by the proviso.' The term "tax" has been interpreted broadly and
' While priority claims arc ranked in terms of payment between the various classes, unsecured
tax claims are not rankcJ among the various governmental units, but are payable equally in priority.
Thus, for example, tle claims of the states are not superior to those of counties or cities. See Note,
Insolvency-Equal Priority of State Unemployment Compensation Taxes and Federal Taxes, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1943). See also note 21 infra.
33 COLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 64.401 [3] (14th ed. Moore 1966) (hereinafter cited as COLLIER).
4
COLLIER § 64.02[2] n.13. Cf., In -re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.
1956), 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 196 (1958)
(valid chattel mortgage superior to landlord's claim under 5
64(a) (5)).
Claims entitled to priority may also be protected by a lien. See especially the landmark case of
City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1918) (section 64 inapplicable to tax.claims secured by
valid liens); 3 COLLIER § 64.403 n.13. Questions of tax liens often arise in connection with claims
of the federal governsent under the Internal Revenue Code. Section 6321 of the 1954 Code creates
a statutory lien on all property and property rights of the bankrupt in favor of the United States
to secure tax claims. On this subject, see Comment, Avoiding Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 39
TEXAS L. REV. 616 (1961).

A priority should be distinguished from a preference. A preference is described by § 60 of the
act, while a priority derives its status from § 64. Preferences are those acts of allegedly insolvent
individuals which attempt to subordinate the claim of one or more creditors to those of others
having no better right, usually by assigning specific property, which should be available to all
creditors equally, to specific creditors for the satisfaction of unsecured antecedent debts.
53 COLLIER § 64.404; 2 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 797 (Henderson ed. 1956) (hereinafter
cited as REMINGTON).
O3
COLLIER § 64.405; 2 REMINGTON § 797; Note, Bankrutcy-The Effect Given Courts'

Interprtations of Slate Taxing Statutes Under Section 64(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Act: The
Constrsction Under Section 64 (a) (4) of a State Statute Providing for a Tax Alternative in Nature,
8 O,-sso ST. L.J. 93 (1941); Note, Tax Claims in Bankrupecy, 29 VA. L. REv. 206, 208-10 (1942).
7 Bankruptcy Act, § 64(a) (4), 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (1966).
' The proviso reads as follows: "And provided further, That no order shall be made for the
payment of a tax assessed against any property of the bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest
of the bankrupt estate therein as determined by the court."
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includes real and personal property, excise, franchise, sales, and workmen's
compensation taxes.' The courts have noted, however, that state classification is not necessarily determinative."0 The second requirement, that the
tax be legally due and owing by the bankrupt at the time the petition in
bankruptcy is filed, has led to the disallowance of taxes assessed later than
the date of filing, and to the disallowance of tax claims which are not the
personal debts of the bankrupt."
The third requirement for priority treatment was added by 1966
amendments to the act, providing for the discharge of certain tax claims
and providing further that allowable claims must not have been discharged
prior to the proceeding wherein they are asserted. The fourth limitation
upon the establishment of priority claims is found in the proviso to section 64 (a) (4) of the act. The statute presently reads:
The debts to have priority . . . shall be . . . (4) taxes which became
legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State
or any subdivision thereof which are not released by a discharge in bankruptcy: . ..provided . . . that no order shall be made for the payment
of a tax assessed against any property of the bankrupt in excess of the value
of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein as determined by the court."
The proviso has been interpreted to prohibit using the funds of the general
estate to pay priority claims for taxes assessed against property which is not
available to the trustee for distribution.
In Nussbaum the personal property tax of California was assessed upon
the tangible personal assets of the bankrupt's California business-furniture, fixtures, and inventory."' There was no question of its meeting the
requirement that the claim must represent a tax. The tax claim met the
second requirement because it was legally due and owing prior to the filing
of the petition, and, according to the applicable California statute, was a
personal debt of the bankrupt." In addition, the claim had not been dis93 COLLIER § 64.404[2];

6 REMINGTON

388-401.

'oIn re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D. Il1. 1939), and cases cited therein. But cf.,
In re Ashland Emery & Corundum Co., 229 Fed. 829 (D. Mass. 1916). A recent exposition of the
view that state characterization is not controlling is Standard Oil Co. v. Kurtz, 330 F.2d 178
(8th Cir. 1964). See also Note, Ban~kruptcy--Te Effect Given State Taxing Statutes Under
Section 64 (a) (4) of the Bankruptcy Act, snpra note 6.
113 COLLIER S 64.405.
6

"2 Section 4(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 104, as amended, 1966. When Nussbaum
was decided the statute read as follows, although the court was careful to point out that the 1966
amendment had no effect on the issue of that case: "The debts to have priority . .. shall be . . .
(4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof: Provided, That no order shall be made for the payment of a tax assessed against
any property of the bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein
as determined by the court."
3
" See, e.g., Waco v. Bryan, 127 Fed. 79 (5th Cir. 1904); Chattanooga v. Hill, 139 Fed. 600
(6th Cir. 1905). But cf., It re Veitch, 101 Fed. 251 (D. Conn. 1900) (in the absenct of a lien
the tax claim is not allowable).
14257 F. Supp. 498, 499 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
'"Revenue & Taxation § 2186, DEERING'S CAL. CODE ANN.
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charged by prior bankruptcy proceedings. However, a more difficult problem was to meet the requirements of the proviso.
II. THE PRIORITY CLAIM

Origin of Priority Status Before Nussbaum no reported case had decided
the precise issue of whether a state tax claim was allowable if the taxed
property had been sold and the particular business discontinued. Analogies,
however, could be drawn. For example, in cases involving property exempt
from creditors under state law tax claims had been disallowed under the
proviso on the theory that such property never entered the bankrupt
estate."6 And when non-exempt property actually entered the estate of a
bankrupt but was released therefrom because it was encumbered in excess
of its value, the state was barred from seeking priority treatment for tax
claims from the general estate.'
Because of the lack of precedent, the court examined the origin and
development of the statutory provision." The court found that legislative
history supports the view that both exempt and abandoned property were
contemplated by Congress when the proviso was added. While priority
treatment was available as early as the act of 1867,"' it was not until the act
of 1898 that the guarantee emerged in substantially the present form.
There Congress declared that "the court shall order the trustee to pay all
taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State,
county, district, or municipality in advance of the payment to creditors. '
As a result of the interpretations of this section, questions as to the fairness
of some payments arose." These objections came when the trustee was required to pay taxes assessed against property which was not subject to the
court's jurisdiction and formed no part of the bankrupt estate. Although
the United States Supreme Court had declared that "exempted property
16Waco v. Bryan, 127 Fed. 79 (5th Cir. 1904). But see the exception of spendthrift trustsin
Leuschner v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1958), and cases cited at
707 n.4.
87 3"COLLIER § 64.402[2].
1S 2 57 F. Supp. at 499, 500. Collier states: "[T]he provision evidently contemplated abandonment of the bankrupt's interest by the trustee, coupled with a bar against any priority payment
of a tax in such a case." 3 COLLIER § 64.402[2].
" Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 530. Moreau has noted that as far back as 1789 the First
Congress provided for priority payment of taxes due the United States, but this was not a comprehensive part of the Bankruptcy Act until 1867. Moreau, Government Claims in Bankruptcy and
Reorganization Proceedings, 9 J.B.A. KAN. 150 (1940). The origin of priority treatment for tax
claims has been said to be the early common law concept of sovereignty. Note, Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 29 VA. L. REv. 206, 206-07 (1942).
'030 Stat. 563 (1898).
2'There was also some question as to the relative status of tax claims in relation to other claims
entitled to priority. One view was that the court would give priority to taxes oxer all other priority
claims; another was that tax claims would be paid only after all other priority claims; and the
third view was that taxes would rank only ahead of wages in priority. The question was settled by
the 1926 statute, which gave taxes fourth priority. See 3 COLLIER § 64.402[1] n.2.
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constitutes no part of the assets in bankruptcy,""' and was therefore not
subject to distribution by the trustee, he was nevertheless obliged to pay
tax claims against this property from the other property of the bankrupt
estate.'" In addition, there were often tax claims in excess of the equity of
the bankrupt in specific non-exempt property. These claims, too, were entitled to full payment from the general hotchpot. '4 In such cases the property was often so heavily encumbered that the estate realized little or nothing therefrom and yet was liable for taxes which otherwise might have
been paid by lienholders.'
To correct these abuses, the statute was amended in 1926 to provide that
"no order shall be made for the payment of a tax assessed against the real
estate of a bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt
estate therein.

2

As one commentator noted at the time, "the priority cre-

ated in favor of real estate taxes is limited in effect to a lien upon the bankrupt's equity in the property in question." ' Shortly after the 1926 amendment the Fifth Circuit declared in Fakes v. Girand that "under the
proviso . . . it is clear that the trustee cannot be required to pay taxes
assessed against property set aside to the bankrupt as exempt." 8 In that case
the court refused to allow a claim for taxes on homestead property because
of the proviso.
In the Chandler Act of 1938 the proviso was retained in substantially
the same form, the act merely changing the words "the real estate" to "any
pronerty," and thus including personal as well as real property taxes within
2

Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903).
23
Waco v. Bryan. 127 Fed. 79 (5th Cir. 1904); In re Tilden, 91 Fed. 500 (S.D. Iowa 1899).
24
Chattanooga v. Hill. 139 Fed. 600 (6th Cir. 1905).
25The case of In re Prince & Walter, 131 Fed. 546 (D. Penn. 1904), is indicative of the problem. Here real property taxes, which under state law constituted a lien on the realty, were ordered
paid from the estate prior to paying general, unsecured creditors. The case of Waco v. Bryan, 127
Fed. 79 (sth Cir. 1904). reached a perhaps even more inequitable result. Here the property was
totally excluded from the estate, and, although the city had a lien against the property itself, the
tax claim was ordered paid from the general estate. The inequities of the situation were compounded
by the fact that lienholders who paid tax claims against property in order to protect their lien
were not subrogated to the rights of tle state in bankrupcy proceedings. In re Halsey Flec. Generator Co., 175 Fed. 825 (D.N.J. 1909). But cf., In re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673 (6th Cir. 1907)
(subrogation allowed). However, the inequitable result in these cases was clearly correct under the
contemporaneous law. As one judge pointed out:
On the plain construction of section 64a of the present law, and particularly in
the light of past legislation on the subject, there is no room to hold that it makes any
difference whatever, as to the right of priority, whether property on which taxes
were assessed ever came into the hands of the trustee. The test is given in the statute:
Are the taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, state,
county, district, or municipality claiming the same? If yea, they are entitled to be
paid in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, for thus saith the law.
Waco v. Bryan. 127 Fed. 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1904).
"Act of May 27, 1926, 44 Stat. 667.
2 Colin, An Analysis of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 26 COLUM. L. Ruv.
789,28 803
Fakes(1926).
v. Girand, 23 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1927).
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the proviso."9 Problems of interpretation have been hampered by the fact
that the authors of this change referred to the new provision as "re-enacting" the proviso rather than changing its meaning, leaving no indication of
intent except that furnished by the statute itself.' It is clear, however, that
excise, franchise, and similar intangible taxes were not covered by the
proviso.' If covered, then such taxes would be excluded from priority in
every case 2 because they never consist of "property" in the bankrupt
estate.
Because of the ready alienability of personal property, however, taxes on
such property often assume some of the characteristics of excise or sales
taxes. Immediately after the 1938 amendment two cases arose where the
referees were called upon to determine whether personal property taxes
were allowable as priorities if the property were sold prior to bankruptcy.'
In both cases the referees agreed that "the amendment of 1938 has extended
the proviso formerly applicable only to real estate taxes, to include taxes
upon personal property. In other words . . .no order for [priority] payment of taxes assessed against property of the bankrupt will be made unless
that property comes into the estate and then only up to the value of that
property."34 This view was in line with that expressed by a group of referees in bankruptcy about the same time."
In Nussbaumn the court noted that there was an exception to this doctrine. In the case of In the Matter of Raflowitz a district court, in a well
reasoned opinion, declared that a personal property tax upon inventory was
entitled to a priority, although some of the goods had been sold, and although the state was unable to trace any funds from these sales. " The decision was predicated primarily upon an equitable reading of the statute and
a presumption that the funds were later incorporated in the business. In
light of the legislative and judicial development of the proviso, however,
Raflowitz must represent a judicially declared exception to the plain words
of the statute.
Determination of the Priority Claim In Nussbaunm the court explicitly
refused to extend the exception of Raflowitz and instead returned to the
historical interpretation of the proviso. While the authors of the statute
probably never considered the problem of Nussbaum, it appears that the
296 REMINGTON § 2842.
303 COLLIER § 64.406 n.2.
31See In re Wiloil Corp., 50 F. Supp. 535

(W.D. Pa. 1941)

(compares property and excise

taxes, and holds that a specific motor fuels tax is not covered by the proviso).
32 As to treatment of these claims see generally Note, State Priority to Sales Tax Proceeds in
Bankruptcy, 40 IND. L.J. 233 (1965).
3

ain re Stevens, 45 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 44 (Ref. Kan. 1939); In re Summers Co., 45 Am.
Bankr. R. (n.s.) 123 (Ref. Ohio 1939).
" In re Summers Co., 45 Am. Bankr. R. (n..s)123, 130 (Ref. Ohio 1939).
" Kruse, Tax Claims, Wage Claims and Inheritance, 15 REF. J. 64, 67 (1941).
36 37 F. Supp. 202 (D. Conn. 1941), 55 HARV. L. REv. 137.
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opinion is correct insofar as it refused priority treatment to the claim. As
the court noted, the statutory language is clear, and, in the absence of legislative history to the contrary, it should be given its literal meaning: When
the property upon which the tax is assessed does not enter the bankrupt
estate, the trustee is not required to give priority to the claim. Although
the Raflowitz exception is closely analogous, the court was careful to point
out that Raflowitz is clearly a judicial modification of plain statutory language. Nussbaum also involves factual dissimilarities. Here the tax was
assessed upon the inventory and capital assets of the business-furniture
and fixtures-which were sold at the time the entire business was liquidated.' After the passage of several months and following development and
failure of another business, the funds were no longer logically represented
by the assets of the bankrupt. It does not seem that more recent claims
against the particular business involved should be subordinated to overdue,
personal tax obligations of the bankrupt. In cases such as Nussbaum the
analogies of exempt and abandoned property relied upon by the court
seem more appropriate, especially in view of the clear wording of the
statute and the early referee interpretations.
III.

ALTERNATIVE GROUND: SHARE IN THE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

The state of California did not limit its attempt to participate in distribution to a claim for priority. As an alternative ground, the state sought
to enter court as a general creditor, receiving only that proportionate share
of the estate as its claim bore to the totality of the debts. Again, however,
the court disallowed the claim, holding that "ad valorem taxes owed by
the bankrupt are to be paid out of the bankrupt estate only if the taxed
property comes into the hands of the trustee or if the bankrupt estate has
an interest in the taxed property which is not abandoned or exempt.""
In order for an unsecured claim to be paid in bankruptcy it must be
(1I provable,"9 and (2) personally owed by the bankrupt.' In some early
cases creditors contended that tax claims were not strictly debts under
section 63 of the act, but were quasi-contractual obligations and therefore
not provable in bankruptcy proceedings.41 However, this contention was
uniformly rejected, and the decisions held that taxes are "provable" within
the meaning of the statute.4' As Remington points out, "provability may
" In Nussbaum it appears from the opinion that if the funds had been traceable priority status
would have been allowed to the amount of the funds traced. 257 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D. Tex.
1966). On the subject of tracing funds in relation to intangible taxes such as sales taxes, see 42
IND. L.J. 233, 243 (1965).
38 257 F. Supp. at 501.
9 2 REMINGTON § 797.
40 3 COLLIER S 63.03.

"tSee, e.g., United States v. Bernstein, 16 F.2d 233, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1926), where the court
examines most early cases on this point.
'Ibid; In "reKootenai Motor Co., 41 F.2d 399 (N.D. Idaho 1930).
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be said to extend, generally, to every tax valid under the law imposing it."
In addition, under California law personal property assessments are the
personal debts of the owner of the property and therefore are allowable
under the requirements of the statute."
Nevertheless, authority existing prior to Nussbaum was in conflict as to
whether the tax claim was entitled to a pro rata share if disallowed as a
priority. On one hand the referee's decision in In re Stevens held that personal property taxes were entitled neither to priority nor to pro rata sharing except to the extent of the interest of the estate in the property taxed.'
In In re Summers Co., however, another referee held that such taxes, while
not entitled to priority treatment, were nevertheless entitled to share in
general dividends under section 63 of the act."
The basis for the decision in the Stevens case rests on the fact that the
proviso is unlimited in language: "No order shall be made.." Thus, in the
view of the referee, the act should be applied literally. In the Summers case,
however, the referee pointed out that this language must be read in context, and inasmuch as it is included in a section entitled "Debts Which
Have Priority," he reasoned that the proviso applied only to priority
claims, not to attempts to secure general treatment for tax claims under a
different section of the act."7 He pointed out that an ordinary wage claimant, normally entitled to priority, could also qualify as a general creditor."
In addition, the referee noted that unless such claims were allowed, there
would result a hiatus in the statute-that tax claims could be used to prove
insolvency but would not be entitled to share in the dividends.4" In Nussbaum the court rejected the Summers view, preferring the position of the
referee in Stevens. In doing so, it followed the course set by the Fifth Circuit in Fakes v. Girand, where the court refused to allow a tax claim altogether, without discussing the status of the state as a general creditor."0
In Nussbaum the court reasoned:
Property which does not enter the bankrupt estate does not become a part
of the estate and is of no value to the estate or to the creditors of the estate.
The burden of paying taxes levied upon such property should fall upon the
bankrupt or upon the purchasers who took the property subject to the
taxes then due and owing; it should not fall upon creditors of the estate
432 REMINGTON § 797, n.12.
44Supra note 15. While the tax is a personal debt of the bankrupt it would also constitute a

lien on any real property owned by the bankrupt in California. Revenue & Taxation § 2189,
2189.3, DEERING'S CAL. CODE ANN. In this case there was no lien on the personalty involved.
4545 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 44 (Ref. Kan. 1939).
4645 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 123 (Ref. Ohio 1939).
"IId. at 130.
48Id. at 131. But it should be noted that there is no proviso to § 64(a) (2) of the act (wage
claims).
4Id.
at 133-34; see, e.g., In re Kootenai Motor Co., 41 F.2d 399 (N.D. Idaho 1930).
"0 23 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1927).
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who have no interest in the property and who will not benefit from the
payment of the tax claim."
When emphasizing the purchaser as a potential obligor on the tax claim,
however, some importance must be attached to the question of whether the
tax claim has the nature of an in personam or an in rem obligation. If the
latter, the state should clearly not be allowed to share in the general distribution-its appropriate remedy would be to pursue the property itself.
This was the situation in Fakes. If, however, as is the case in Nussbaum, the
obligation is a personal one of the bankrupt, it seems that equitably the
state should be allowed to enter in pari materia with other general unsecured creditors, because the state is itself an unsecured creditor.
Since Nussbaum an additional argument for the allowance of tax claims
has been created by amendment to the statute. Prior to the 1966 amendments tax claims were not discharged by bankruptcy, and after these proceedings the bankrupt remained personally liable. Under the 1966 amendments, however, certain tax claims are discharged by bankruptcy proceedings even when not fully satisfied." Although the tax due in Nussbaum
would not have been discharged,"' in those cases where the tax claim is discharged by bankruptcy proceedings it seems that the state should be allowed to enter the proceedings and present its claim as a general creditor.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the face of the clear language of the statute and the many interpretations of the proviso, the court in Nussbaum was correct in disallowing
this claim priority status. Less clear is the second issue. The decision in the
Summers case seems more persuasive, especially when coupled with the
effect of the 1966 amendments. Were the obligation protected by an encumbrance upon the sold property, this would not be the case; but the
obligation in Nussbauim was merely a personal obligation of the bankrupt,
not.coupled with any right in the property itself. In view of recent amendments to the statute other decisions should be more concerned with this distinction. For the present, however, Nussbaum will help to fill the need for
authority in this area of the law.
W. Richard Jones
5257 F. Supp. at 501.
"Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1938)
(debts not affected by a discharge) was
amended effective October 1, 1966. It presently reads, in part:
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are taxes which became legally
due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however . ...
But a discharge shall not be a bar to any remedies available under applicable law to
the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof, against the exemption
of the bankrupt allowed by law and duly set apart to him under this title: And
provided further, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release or affect any tax lien.
13 Because it became due and owing to the state within 3 years preceding bankruptcy. See also
note 12 supra.

